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Tunisia's financially  pressed  pension  system  needs to rational-
ize benefits and improve investment  performance  in the near
future. To anticipate  detericrating  demographics,  steps should
also be taken to prepare for more  radical  reform:  one pillar  for
redistribution,  and one fully capitalized.
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Tunisia's pension system  provides  old age,  capricious  favoring  of workers  with low incomes
survivorship,  and disability  benefits  to retired  and short credited  service).
and disabled  workers  and their dependents.  It is a
partally funded system based  on solidarity  *  Faces increasing  financial  pressures  because
between  generations.  It is designed  to provide  it is maturing  and expanding  benefits,  but its
insurance  against  loss of income  in old age,  reserves  show poor investment  performance  and
especially  for people who live longer  than  it has failed to adjust  contribution  rates.
average,  and to redistribute  income more  favor-
ably  toward low-  'ncome retired workers.  Only  to  Vittas  proposes  the following  main reforms:
a limited  extent does it achieve  a third objective:
compulsory  long-term  saving.  * In the short run, reallocating  social security
contributions  from family allowances  to pen-
Vittas analyzes  the structure  of Tunisia's  sions  and improving  the financial  performance  of
pension  system,  assesses its financial  condition,  reserves.
and sets out options  for pension  reform.  He finds
that the current system:  * In the medium  term, rationalizing  benefit
formulas  through  gradual  use of lifetime  actual-
* Is fragmented,  comprising  several  schemes  ized  earnings,  indexing  pensions,  gradually
with different  rules and conditions.  increasing  the normal  retirement  age,  and
expanding  the use of proportional  pensions  for
. Promises  generous  benefits,  with high  workers  with short careers.
targeted  replacement  rates  that may be
unsustainable.  * In the longer term, a more radical  program
to create  a fully capitalized  pillar  that comple-
* Despite  high benefits,  operates  with low  ments  a redistributive  pillar paying  basic  ben-
contribution  rates,  because  both the system and  efits.  This would  generate  long-term  savings,
the labor force are young.  stimulate  the development  of capital  markets,
and facilitate  the privatization  program.  A third
* Only  weakly  links contributions  and ben-  pillar, voluntary  savings  encouraged  by tax
efits. Is  suffers  from evasion  of contributions  and  savings,  would cover  self-employed  people not
inflated  benefit claims and redistribution  (from  covered  by occupational  schemes.
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The Tunisian  pension  system  offers  old age, survivorship  and disability  benefits  to
retired  and disabled  workers  and their  dependents.  Its main  objectives  are insurance  and
redistribution:  insurance  against  the loss of income  in old age  due to retirement  and against
the risk of excessive  longevity;  redistribution  in favor  of low income  retired  workers.
Compulsory  long-term  saving,  the third  main  objective  of pension  systems,  is attained  only to
a limited  extent  in Tunisia.
In principle,  the system  is based  on the concept  of solidarity  within  and across
generations. Being  a compulsory  public  system  it aims  to cover  risks, such  as increases  in
life expectancy  or high inflation,  that private  insurance  markets  find it difficult  to cover. In
practice,  however,  attainment  of these  objectives  depends  on the effective  degree  of solidarity
within  and across  generations  and on the ability  of the system  to withstand  the increased
costs  of high  inflation,  increased  longevity  and changes  in demographic  structure.
Formally,  the Tunisian  system  is a partially  funded  defined  benefit  system  based  on
scaled  premiums. In these  systems,  the contribution  rate is set  at a high  enough  level to
enable  the creation  of a reserve  fund  so that projected  inflows  from annual  contributions  and
investment  income  cover the projected  outflows  during  a given  period, known  as the period
of equilibrium.  In principle,  only the investment  income  of the reserve  fund  is used  to cover
current  benefits,  with  the principal  left intact. When  _urrent  receipts  from contributions  plus
investment  income  are no longer  adequate  to cover  current  benefits,  the contribution  rate is
raised  to the level  corresponding  to another  period  of equilibrium.  The period  of eqL  ilibrium
should  be sufficiently  long to guarantee  a certain  degree  of premium  stability.
Scaled  premium  systems  require  periodic  adjustments  in contribution  rates  based  on
actuarial  studies'  and reflecting  changing  demographic  structures,  the growing  maturity  of
the system,  any expansion  of benefits,  and the investment  income  of the fund. However,  in
many  countries  with such  systems,  problems  occur  because  of delays  in actuarial  reviews  and
adjustment  of contribution  rates. Moreover,  raising  the contribution  rate may not be feasible
beyond  a certain  point, in which  case reductions  in benefits  as well as altemative  forms  of
pension  schemes  may need  to be contemplated.
In addition  to being  a partially  funded,  defined  benefit  system  based  on scaled
premiums,  the Tunisian  pension  system  exhibits  the following  features:
I  At the time of writing  this paper, the latest  actuarial  review  was effected  by ILO in
1989  and was based  on data for 1986/87. The Tunisian  authorities  have  argued  that this was
a bad year for assessing  the long-term  financial  prospects  of the pension  funds  because  of the
reduced  level  of employment  and the adverse  effects  of the economic  recession. Since  then,
a further  actuarial  review  was undertaken  and completed  in 1992. This review  confirms  the
findings  of this pape-.*  It is a. fragmented  system, comprising  several schemes with different rules and
conditions.
*  It promises  generous  benefits  with  high targeted  replacement  rates, which  are
difficult  to sustain  in the long run 2.
*  Despite  the high  level of benefits,  it operates  with  relatively  low contribution
rates, mainly  because  of the young  demographic  structure  of the labor  force
and the young  age of the system.
*  The system  has a weak  link between  contributions  and benefits. As a result, it
has suffered  from eclectic  solidarity,  which  manifests  itself  in evasion  of
contributions  but inflated  benefit  claims,  and from capricious  redistribution,
which  favors  workers  with  low incomes  and short credited  service. Like other
defined  benefit  pension  systems,  the Tunisian  system  is also exposed  to
perverse  redistribution  arising  from differences  in life expectancy  between  low
and high income  people  and from differences  in career patterns  of earnings.
*  After  building  significant  reserves  in its early years  of operation,  the system,
especially  the fund  covering  the private  sector,  has faced  financial  pressures.
These  have  emanated  from  the growing  maturity  of the system,  the expansion
of benefits,  the poor investment  performance  of reserves  and the failure  to
adjust  contribution  rates.
*  Macroeconomic  developments  in the 1980s  have  contributed  to the poor
financial  performance  of the system,  but demographic  factors  have  continued
to be favorable.
In the long run, the demographic  structure  will  become  unfavorable.  System  reform
needs  to be considered  and implemented  at an early stage  to avoid a painful  adjustment  and
transition  later on.  First and foremost,  there is a strong  need  to rationalize  the benefit
formulas  used  in order to minimize  the redistributive  and disincentive  effects  of existing
rules. But measures  to reform  the system  may also  include  a reduction  in benefits,  an
increase  in contribution  rates, an improvement  in the financial  performance  of reserves,
integration  of existing  systems  into  a national  first  pillar  offering  basic  benefits,  and
development  of privately-run  second  and third  pillars  to offer complementary  benefits.
2  Achievement  of these  pension  targets  is, however,  undermined  by two factors:  the
partial  indexation  of pensions  in the private  sector;  and the fact that a substantial  proportion
of workers  do not have  full  careers  to entitle  them to a full pension. Nevertheless,
pensioners  of the public  sector  and financial  institutions  with full  careers  obtain  very high
pensions.
2The basic objectives  of pension reform should be:
*  the payment of adequate, but affordable  and therefore sustainable  benefits;
*  the creation of a strong link between contributions  and benefits to reduce the
risk of adverse redistribution  and minimize  distortions  in labor market
incentives; and
*  the generation  of long-term savings to fund future benefits, stimulate  the
development  of capital markets and facilitate  the privatization  program.
3The Present System
Structure.
The Tunisian  pension system is characterized  by significant  fragmentation. It
comprises 3 funds (caisses) that operate 12 different schemes (regimes) with their own rules
and conditions 3:
CAVIS (Caisse d'Assurance Vieillesse,  Invalidite  et Survie) operates 7
schemes that cover dependent  and independent  workers in the private sector.
Th_ e include the general scheme for employees  in the nonagricultlral sector,
the scheme for self-employed  people of the nonagricultural  sector, the scheme
for agricultural workers, the improved scheme for agricultural  workers, the
scheme for independent  farmers and the scheme for Tunisian workers
overseas.  CAVIS also operates a complementary  scheme for nonagricultural
employees  earning in excess of 6 times the minimum  wage (SMIG).  Of all
these schemes, the general scheme for !mployees in the nonagricultural  sector
is by far the most important.
CNRPS (Caisse Nationale  de Retraite et de Prevoyanxe  Sociale)  operates the
main scheme for public sector employees  plus 3 specialized  schemes for
members of the government,  members of parliament, and governors.
CREGT (Caisse de Retraite et de Prevoyance  des services publics de
l'Electricfte, Gaz et du Transport) covers the personnel of some national  public
utilities.
Two of the schemes, the general scheme for employees  in the nonagricultural  sector
and the scheme for public sector employees, account  between themselves  for 90% of covered
affiliates  and for 84% of pensioners.  Tim coverage  and size of each scheme are shown in
Table 1.
Because the pension population  is still very small, pension benefits absorb a small
percentage of GDP (Table 2).  Nevertheless,  the growing maturity of the system and
expansion  in eligibility have resulted in a rise in pension benefits as a proportion of GDP
from 1.2% in 1980 to 1.7% in 1985 and 2.4% in 1990. Public sector pensions represent
61  % of all pensions, while private sector pensions (CAVIS)  account for 39% of the total.  In
1980, the share of private sector pensions  was 27%.
3  For a comprehensive  description  of the Tunisian social security system, see Kasmni
(1989).
4Table  1
TUNISIA:  Coverag, of Pension qohemes, 1990
Active  Passive  Depsndency
(000.)  (0008)  Rate (%)
CAVIS
General Scheme  594.7  100.8  16.9
Independents, nonfarm  43.6  2.5  5.7
Agricultural workers  5.2  9.5  64.6
Agr. workers improved  9.7
Independent farmers  38.1  19.4  50.9
Tunisian workers overseas  0.1
Total CAVIS  691.4  132.2  19.1
Public sector  424.6  83.5  19.7
CREGT  15.2  4.1  27.0
Total  1131.2  219.8  19.4
Source:  Ministry of Planning
Table 2
TUNISIAs Pension Benefits
(million  dinars)  I
1980  1985  1990
CAVIS  11.4  45.4  103.6
CNRPS  28.3  63.6  152.7
CREGT  2.0  4.9  9.4
Total  41.7  113.9  265.7
% of GDP  1.2  1.7  2.4
Source:  Ministry of Planning
5The fragmentation  of the system  and the differences  in benefits  and contributions  have
impeded  labor  mobility,  althou2h  measures  taken  in recent  years  have  allowed  the
transferability  of pension  rights  between  the maiP  schemes. Because  the scheme  for public
sector  employees  is more  generous,  there  are stronger  incentives  for employees  to transfer
from the private  to the public  sector  late in their careers,  a feature  that works  against  the
need  to stimulate  the development  of the private  sector  and promote  the transfer  of
experienced  staff  from public  sector  institutions  to private  enterprises.
The Tunisian  authorities  passed  a law in 1986  providing  for the integration  of the
system  and the creation  of a single  pension  fund  to cover  all employees  in the public  and
private  sectors. However,  the provisions  of this act have  not been  implemented  yet.  Several
reasons  have  been  advanced  for the non-implementation  of the 1986  legislation.  First, it was
felt that implementation  in an abnormal  year, 1987,  would  have  exacerbated  dis.-uption  and
mnight  have  led to increased  deficits. Second,  there  was strong  opposition  to the proposed
reform  because  it affected  vested  interests  hi some  sectors  and imposed  the administrative
separation  of the provision  of pension,  health  and family  benefits  that would  have  inci ased
administrative  inconvenience  and operating  costs  without  any commensurate  benefits. And,
third, the view prevailed  that it would  be preferable  to proceed  gradually  in reforming  the
system  through  the harmonization  of the conditions  of affiliation  of different  schemes.
The  Level  of Benefits.
Benefits  vary considerably  across  individual  schemes,  depending  on the definition  of
pensionable  salary, the accrual  factor  for each  year of service,  required  length  of service  and
retirenment  age. In general,  the level  of benefits,  though  comparable  to those  prevailing  in
many  other  developing  countries,  is very  high and difficult  to sustain  in the long run. The
following  features  underscore  the high cost  of the system:
First, the normal  retirement  age is 60 years  (for both men  and women). This is
reduced  to 55 for hazardous  and arduous  occupations,  while  a minimum  retirement  age of 50
years  is applied  for early  retirement  and proportional  pensions. For public  sector  employees
with 35 years  of service,  the retirement  age is reduced  to 55.
Many  developing  countries  have  low retirements  ages. This is explained  by the
shorter  life expectancy  and poorer  health  of older  people  and also  by the need  to create
employment  opportunities  for the fast growing  young  segments  of the labor force. In many
countries,  including  Tunisia,  early retirement  has been  encouraged  as a means  of coping  with
high unemployment  among  the young. However,  early retirement  policies  have  not always
achieved  the desired  results  as retired  people  have  tended  to re-enter  the labor market,  often
in an informal  way. In principle,  the normal  retirement  age should  be extended  in line with
improvements  in the life expectancy  and productive  ability  of older  people,  since  low
retirement  ages when  iife  expectancy  increases  add considerably  to the financial  burden  of
pension  systems.
6Second,  the required  length  of service  for a normal  pension  is 15 years  for public
sector  employees  (10 years  for manual  workeis),  10 yeais for private  sector  employees  and
25 years  for public  utility  employees.  However,  lov  er minimum  service  requirements  of 5
years for private  sector  employees  and 15 years  for putblic  utility  employees  apply  for early
retirement  and proportional  pensions. Together  with the lower  ininimun  retiroment  age,
these  are applied  in cases  of .ompulsory  redundancy  as a result  of company  closures.
Working  mothers  of 3 living  children  are entitled  to retire after 15 years  of service,
irrespective  of age.
The required  minimum  length  of servic. tends  to cause significant  distortions  in the
pension  system. In the first  place, workers  who  do not meet  the required  minimum  do not
qualify  for a pension. Although  they have  the right  to a refund  of their own  contributions,
the treatment  at the margin  between  those  who  just qualify  and those  who  just fail to qualify
is extremely  iniquitous. Ideally,  minimum  vesting  requirements  should  become  redundant
with the use of proportional  pensions  and should  thus  be eliminated.  However,  the benefit
formula  should  also be adjusted  to avoid  imparting  extremely  favorable  treatment  to workers
with limited credited service (see below).
Third, the maximum  replacement  (pension)  rate is 90% of gross  pensionable  salary
for public  sector  employees  and 80% for private  sector  (CAVIS)  and public  utility  (CREGT)
employees.  This is payable  after 40 years  of service  in the public  sector  and public  utilities
but after only 30 years  in the private  sector.
Replacement  rates  of 80%  and 90% of gross  salary  are extremely  high  and
unsustainable  in the long  run, except  perhaps  in the case  of fully  funded,  nonredistributive
schemes. Even  then, the real rate of return  on accumulated  reserves  would  have  to exceed
by a significant  margin  the growth  rate of real wages'. At the very least, the replacement
rate should  be related  to net salary,  i.e. after  deduction  of contributions  to the pension
system. However,  long-term  viability  of a partially  funded  system  would  require  a much
reduced  replacement  rate, the level  of which  would  depend  on the overall  structure  of the
pension  system  and the role assigned  to complementary  privately-run  schemes.
Fourth, the annual  accrual  factor  is unusually  high in some  cases. For instance,  in
the public  sector, the accrual  rate is 2% per year for the first ten years  of service,  increasing
to 3% per year for the next 10 years  and falling  back  to 2% thereafter. In the public  utility
sector,  it is 2% per year throughout,  but in the private  sector,  the accrual  factor  is a very
generous  4% per year for the first 10 years  and 2% thereafter. Effective  accrual  rates  are
augmented  by service  credits  (bonifications),  which  zr-;  particularly  important  for public
sector  and public  utility  employees.
4  For the relationship  between  real rates  of return  and growth  rates of real wages  in
fully  funded,  defined  contribution  schemes,  see Vittas  (1992a).
7An accrual  rate of 4% per year for the first  '0  years  of service  favors  workers  with
limited  credited  service. It involves  redistribution  from  workers  with tong credited  service  to
those  with  short credited  service  and encourages  evasion  of the system  tor most  of a person's
working  career and participation  for the minimum  required  period. Use of a constant  rccrual
rate irrespective  of length  of service  would  avoid  this disto-tion. A degressive  benefit
formula,  whereby  high  income  workers  would  receive  a lower  benefit  rate, could  be used  to
effect  redistribution  in favor  of poorer  workers. Service  credits  also increase  the effective
accrual  rate and increase  the burden  of pension  systems,  often  in a nontransparent  way.
Apart  from military  se.vice,  the use of service  credits  should  be discouraged.
Fifth,  a minimum  pension  equal  ' o two-thirds  SMIG  is paid to all workers  eligible  for
a normal  pension  in the public  and private  sector  and equal  to one-half  SMIG  for those
eligible  for an early retirement  or proportional  pension.
The payment  of minimum  pensions  is highly  desirable  for redistributive  purposes  and
for alleviating  poverty  among  older  people. However,  in combination  with the low minimum
required  service,  it may result  in highly  unequal  treatment  of workers  with  otherwise  similar
economic  and social  conditions.
Sixth,  the pensionable  salary  is also defined  in a generous  way. It is the most
favorable  annual  remuneration  of the last three years  of service  in the public  sector,  the
average  remuneration  over the last 3 or 5 years  of service,  up to a ceiling  of six times
SMIG,  in the general  scheme  of the private  sector  and the best remuneration  of the last ten
years  of service  in the public  utility  sector  (provided  it was received  for at least  6 months).
This system  encourages  the under-reporting  of salaries  during  most  of a person's
career and over-reporting  during  the last few years  before  retirement. The development  of
efficient  computerized  accounting  records  should  permit  the use of average  lifetime  actualized
earnings. The  Tunisian  authorities  is.ued a decree  in 1989  extending  the period  for defining
the pensionable  salary  to the average  of the last 10 years  prior to retirement. However,  this
regulation  has yet to be implemented  because  of strong  opposition  from affiliates,  who
objected  to the sudden  increase  in the relevant  period  from 3 to 10 years. A gradual
extension  of the base period,  adding  one year at a time until  the full  career earnings  are
takea  into account,  would  avoid  these  objections  and would  achieve  the desired  result  in the
long run. Use of actualized  lifetime  earnings  would  also obviate  the need  for ann,al accrual
factors  and would  permit  the use of global  degressive  replacement  rates similar  to those
found  in the United  States 5.
5  In the United  States,  pensions  for newly  retired  workers  are based  on average  indexed
monthly  earnings  (AIME). ADME  are derived  by adjusting  past actual  earnings  to the
average  wage  index. In 1992,  the replacement  rates  used  by the Social  Security
Administration  were 90% of the first  US$ 387 of AIME, 32%  of the next  US$ 1,946  of
AIME  and 16%  of AIME  in excess  of US$ 2,333. The bracket  limits  are adjusted
8The use of actualized (indexed)  lifetime earnings avoids the problem caused by
differences  in earnings profiles.  In final salary defined benefit schemes, workers with rising
career earnings benefit at the expense of those with constant or declining  profiles.  The
steeper the rise late in e?  worker's career the greater the gain at the expense of other workers.
As workers with steeply rising earnings profiles, especially  late in their career, tend to
belong to senior managerial  classes with high incomes, this feature of final salary schemes
gives rise to a perverse redistribution  from low to high income workers.
Another aspect that causes a similarly perverse redistribution  from the poor to the rich
t  -s  from differences  in life expectancy  between rich and poor workers.  To the extent that
iagh income workers live longer in retirement, they would tend to achieve higher rates of
return on their lifetime contributions  than low income workers.  A way to avoid this problem
is either to use different mortality  tables, and thus pay higher pensions to low income
workers, or to introduce both progressive contribution  rates and degressive  benefit formulas.
Seventh, the treatment of inflation prior and after retirement  produces erratic effects
across different schemes. It is a major determinant  of their financial  condition  and of the
capricious  redistribution  among  affiliates  and pensioners. In general, none of the schemes
provides for the indexation  of the benefit formula (although  this is relevant only for the
schemes covering the private sector).  The treatment of pensions  in payment varies
considerably  among the different schemes. Pensions for public sector employees  are indexed
to wage levels, but those of private sector employees  are adjusted only by a proportion
(given by the applicable  replacement  rate) of the absolute dinar increase  in the minimum
wage.  Pensions of public utility employees  are adjusted at the discretion of the CREGT,
depending on the financial  condition  of the fund.
Tunisia has experienced  moderate  inflation of around 10% per year over the 1980s
and this has mitigated  any adverse effect from the failure to index the benefit formula and
adjust pensions fully to the rate of inflation. The nonindexation  of the benefit formula affects
employees  of the private sector, whose pensionable  salary is the average of their last three or
five years before retirement. With a 10% rate of inflation, the nominal  pensionable  salary
would be 9% lower than the actualized  pensionable  salary for the three-year average and
17% lower for the five-year average.  For public sector and public utility employees, the
nonindexation  of the benefit formula is largely irrelevant since the pensionable  salary is not
defined as a period average.
automatically  each year with the change in average wages.  The degressive  replacement  rates
used achieve a social pension  equal to 56% of earnings for a tow earner (defined as US$ 935
of AIME), 42% for an average earner (defined as US$ 2,245 of AIME) and 27% for a high
earner (defined as US$ 5,500 of AIME).  Pensions in payment are increased annually by the
cost of living adjustment (COLA).
9^1~~~~~~~-  7 
The indexation  of public  sector  pensions  to wage  inflation  provides  full  protection  to
those  pensions,  except  when  real wages  are falling. In the private  sector,  minimum  pensions
are indexed  to SMIG,  but higher  pensions  enjoy  only partial  protection  against  inflation.
Thus, over the long run, there is a tendency  for all private  sector  pensions  to converge
towards  the level  of the minimum  pension,  the rate of convergence  being  faster, the higher
the rate of inflation.
The  question  of whether  pensions  should  be linked  to prices  or wages  is an open issue
among  pension  specialists. Price  indexation  protects  the standard  of living  of pensioners
(except  if their cost  of living  increases  faster  than the average  because  of big rises in the cost
of such  items  as medical  care). However,  price  indexation  may cause  a big financial  burden
on the pension  system  if real wages  (and  by extension  real revenues  from contributions)  are
falling. Wage  indexation  avoids  this problem  and also maintains  the relative  standard  of
pensioners  vis-a-vis  active  workers,  but would  require  higher  contribution  rates than price
indexation  if real wages  are rising. The choice  of indexing  would  depend  in practice  on the
objectives  of the pension  system  and the feasibility  of levying  sufficiently  high contributions
rates. However,  whatever  the method  of indexing,  it should  be applied  equally  to all pension
schemes  and should  not discriminate  in favor  of public  sector  employees  as is currently  the
case.
Eighth,  survivorship  pensions  in the public  sector  scheme  amount  to 75% for widows
and 10%  for each  child  of less than 21 years  of age, subject  to an aggregate  limit  of 100%  of
the retirement  pension. For employees  in the nonagricultural  private  sector, survivorship
pensions  amount  to 75% for widows  without  dependent  children  and to a combined  100%  for
widows  with dependent  children  (70%  for the widow  and 30% for a single  child  or 50% for
the widow  and 50% for 2 or more  dependent  children).
Survivorship  pensions  for widows  were increased  from  50% to 75% in 1982. This
increase  is justified  for maintaining  the real standard  of living  of survivors,  although  the
sudden  rise by half  in survivorship  pensions  imposed  a heavy  burden  on the finances  of the
pension  system. If the pensions  for retired  workers  are set  at a reasonable  level,  a 75%
survivorship  rate would  seem  appropriate  and in line with  international  practice.
Ninth,  disability  pensions  in the private  sector  amount  to 50% of pensionable  salary.
A minimum  service  of 5 years  is required. The pension  rate is increased  by 0.5% for every
quarter  of service  in excess  of 15 years. Disability  pensions  were increased  from  40% of
pensionable  salary  in 1982. They  are subject  to the minimum  pension  that is equal  to two-
thirds  of SMIG  and to a maximum  80% replacement  rate.  Similar  conditions  apply  in the
public  sector  and public  utility  schemes.
Tenth, the high  cost of the pension  schemes  and the capricious  redistribution  resulting
from the combination  cf an irrational  benefit  formula  and moderate  inflation  can be seen  in
the following  examples.  Thus, for a worker  contributing  8% of his salary  for 40 years  and
10entitled  to an 80%  pension  under  the CAVIS  scheme,  which  he receives  for 15 years', the
internal  rate of return  (IRR)  would  correspond  to a high  real rate of 4.5%.  For a worker
who contributes  for 10 years only  and receives  a 40% pension,  the IRR would  increase  to
18.8%,  while  for a worker  contributing  for only  5 years  and receiving  a 20% pension,  the
IRR  would  rise further  to 28%. The IRRs  would  be even  higher  for workers  earning  the
minimum  wage, since  after 10 years  they would  be entitled  to a 66% pension  (an IRR  of
24.5%)  and after 5 years to a 50% pension  (involving  an IRR  of 48.5%). These  are very
high  rates, which  are not affected  by inflation  since  minimum  pensions  are fully  indexed.
However,  larger  pensions  benefit  from  partial  indexation  only. Thus, a worker  earning  5
times  the minimum  wage  would  suffer  an erosion  of 7.3% in the real value  of his pension
when  inflation  amounts  to 10%7. As  a result,  the IRR  would  fall to 2.8%.  Even  though
inflation  provides  a leeway  to the Tunisian  pension  system,  the effect  is small  because  of the
moderate  level of inflation.
Eleventh,  both the coverage  and benefits  of agricultural  workers  and of independent
workers  are low. In the case of independents,  this is because  affiliates  choose  to declare  a
very low income  out of nine categories  provided  under  existing  rules. In fact, 85% of
afffliated  independent  workers  declare  income  at the lowest  category  of two-thirds  SMIG.
This policy  has an adverse  effect  on the finances  of the pension  fund  of CAVIS,  although
this is rather  small  because  of the small  amounts  and small  coverage  involved. Afiliation  at
a very low income  has a stronger  adverse  impact  on the finances  of the health  system,  since
independent  workers  have  access  to health  facilities  by paying  a very small  fee.
The Level  of Contributions.
Because  of the young  age of the system  and the young  demographic  structure  of the
Tunisian  labor  force  as well as the partial  funding  of the pension  system,  contribution  rates
are not high by international  standards. The highest  contributior.  rate is 16%  (6%  by
employees  and 10%  by employers)  and is levied  by the CREGT  for public  utility  employees.
The contribution  rate for public  sector  employees  is 12%  (5%  employees  and 7% employers)
and for the general  scheme  of CAVIS  8% (1.25%  by employees,  2.5% by employers  and
4.25% from an allocation  by CNSS).
Despite  its relatively  low contribution  rate, CAVIS  suffers  from extensive  evasion  that
assumed  critical  proportions  during  the 1986-87  economic  recession. The weak  link between
6  A more  realistic  case would  be to assume  that the retired  worker  lives  for 12 years
and his widow  draws  a reduced  pension  for another  8 years. The results  would  not be much
different.
7  The absolute  increase  in the minimum  pension  would  correspond  to a nominal
increase  in his pension  of 2%.  This is one-fifth  the rate of inflation  and the real value  of his
pension  would  fall  by 1.02/1.10.
11contributions  and benefits has encouraged  the perception of the pension system as a tax on
labor rather than as a forced savings scheme. Although the system is based on the principle
of solidarity both within and across generations, in practice solidarity is rather eclectic, being
much stronger in the case of benefits than in the case of contributions.
In line with pay-as-you-go  or partially funded pension systems in most developing
countries (as well as several developed  ones), the private sector schemes suffer from what is
known in Tunisia as the three "sous":  the under-affiliation  of workers (sous-affiliation),  the
under-reporting  of salaries (sous-declaration),  and the under-recovery  of contributions  (sous-
recouvrement). The burden of salary under-reporting  is aggravated  by the existing incentives
to inflate the level of reported salaries during the last three years of employr,ient  that form
the basis for calculating the level of pensionable  salary.  In 1986-87,  the under-recovery  of
contributions  was exacerbated  by the poor financial  condition  of many enterprises.
To combat evasion and the incidence  of the three "sous", the management  of CNSS,
which is responsible for the collection of contributions,  undertook  an effective  campaign in
1989, that involved  regional decentralization  of its offices, improvement  of operating
efficiency, conduct of detailed audits of payrolls, persistent pursuit of firms with a poor
record in affiliating employees  and paying contributions,  imposition  of a high penalty rate for
late payers and willingness  to take legal action to ensure the recovery of contributions  due.
This resulted in a claimed dramatic fall in the extent of evasion.  Coupled with a long
delayed increase in the contribution  rate from 5% to 8% in 1988, there was a substantial  rise
in total revenues.
Financial Condition.
Financial EqlF0ibrium. A pay-as-you-go  system is in financial  equilibrium  when total
annual receipts from contributions  equal total annual payments for pensions (disregarding
administrative  expenses  or assuming  that they are covered by the investment  income earned
on the small fund of liquidity reserves). The contribution  rate (contributions  as a percent of
average earnings of active workers) that is required for financial  equilibrium  is determined
by the replacement  rate (pensions  as a percent of earnings at retirement), the earnings ratio
(average earnings at retirement divided by average earnings of active workers) and the
dependency  rate (the number of beneficiaries  as a percent of the number of contributors).
In algebraic terms, total annual receipts are equal to  R  = c*C*w  where "c" is the
contribution  rate, "C" is the number of contributors  and "w" is average earnings of active
workers.  Total annual payments are equal to  P = b*B*m*w where "b" is the replacement
rate, "B" is the number of beneficiaries  and "m"  is the earnings ratio.  In equilibrium  R = P
and the contribution  rate is, therefore, given by  c = b*m*d where "d" is the dependency
rate (B/C).
Each of the above terms is a complex function of several variables that depend on the
rules and conditions governing the operations of different pension schemes  as well as
12demographic  and economic  factors 8. Assuming  an earnings ratio of 1, a scheme that
promises to pay pensions to retired workers equal to 80% of their pensionable  earnings
would require a contribution  rate of 8% if the dependency  rate is 10% (i.e. one pensioner for
every 10 contributors). But the contribution  rate would have to rise to 24% if the
dependency  rate deteriorates to 30% (3 pensioners  for every 10 contributors)  either because
of demographic  aging, the growing maturity  of the system or widespread  evasion.  Allowing
for the reduced pensions to widows  and orphans, the targeted effective replacement  rate may
fall substantially  depending  on the proportion of widows and orphans in the total number of
beneficiaries. For an effective replacement  rate of 60%, the required contribution  rates
would respectively  amount to 6% and 18%.
In a partially funded scaled premium system, the required contribution  rate is initially
increased by the targeted increase in reserves, but later on during the period of equilibrium  it
is reduced by the amount of investment  income available  to pay pensions after covering
administrative  expenses. The impact of investment  income would clearly depend on the size
of the reserves, in relation to the total salary bill, and on the rate of return.
In Tunisia, the favorable  demographic  structure of the population  and the young age
of the system have allowed the accumulation  of substantial  reserves, despite the relatively
low contribution  rates and the rather ambitious  and generous benefit levels.  In recent years,
however, the three funds have come under financial  pressure because of the growing maturity
of the system, the expansion  of benefits, a rather high level of evasion, the unsatisfactory
investment  performance  of the reserves and the failure to adjust the contribution  rate to the
level required for maintaining  financial  equilibrium. Adverse macroeconomic  developments
have also contributed to the poor financial  performance  of the pension funds, although
demographic  factors have continued to be favorable.
Of the three funds, CAVIS, the fund covering private sector employees, has come
under greater financial  pressure.  Following  the 1988 rise in the contribution  rate and the
effective  campaign  to combat evasion, the deterioration  in the financial  position of CAVIS
has been stopped, but has not yet been reversed, as CAVIS has been unable to rebuild its
reserves and it now operates with a very low level of funding. The other two funds, that
mainly deal with public sector employees, have suffered less from evasion, but their financial
position has deteriorated as a result of the other factors mentiorned  above.
8  For instance, the dependency  rate is affected by the retirement age (for instance an
increase in the retirement  age will lower the number of beneficiaries  and increase the number
of contributors), by policies on early retirement  (which have the opposite effect), by evasion
and unemployment  (which reduce the number of contributors)  and by the number of widows
and orphans entitled to survivorship  pensions.  Similarly, the replacement  rate is affected by
policies of early retirement (since early retirees usually obtain reduced pensions), by the
reduced pensions of widows  and orphans, by the definition  of pensionable  salary and by
pension indexation  policies.
13Demographic  factors. Demographic  factors,  although  immensely  important  for the
long-run  stability  of the system,  have  played  a limited  part in the recent  financial
deteroration  of the pension  schemes. As a result  of the decline  in the birth rate, as well as
the growth  rate, of the Tunisian  population,  the share  of people  aged  less than 20 years has
fallen  from 57% of total population  in 1970  to 48% in 1990. It is expected  to continue
falling  in the future  and to reach  26% by the year 2050  (Table  3).
Table  3
TUNISIA:  Demographic Structure, 1970-2050
1970  1980  1990  2000  2020  2050
(percent of total)
Less than 20 years (Y)  56.8  53.1  48.4  43.7  32.3  25.6
20-59 years  (A)  37.0  41.0  45.0  48.7  56.8  50.4
60 years and over (0)  6.2  5.9  6.7  7.6  10.9  24.0
Old dependency rate (0/A)  16.7  14.4  14.8  15.7  19.0  47.6
Total dependency {(O+Y)/A}  170.3  143.9  122.4  105.3  76.1  98.4
Source:  Based on World Bank population projections.
Because  of the current  structure  of the population  pyramid,  the main  beneficiary  of
the fall in the birth rate has been  the active  population,  i.e. the group  of people  aged  between
20 and 59 years. Their  share  of the total  population  increased  from 37% in 1970  to 45% in
1990. It is expected  to continue  growing  to 57% by the year 2020, though  it will thereafter
fall back to 50% by the year 2050.
The share  of older  people,  those  aged  60 years  or more, fell  in the 1970s  and then
increased  slightly  in the 1980s. It is projected  to grow slowly  but steadily  until the year
2020 but to surge  to 24% by the year 2050.  The all important  demographic  old dependency
rate, i.e. the number  of old people  as a percent  of the active  population,  improved  between
1970  and 1980  from 16.7%  to 14.4%,  but deteriorated  slightly  to 14.8%  in 1990. The old
dependency  rate is projected  to rise gradually  to 15.7%  in 2000  and 19%  in 2020  but to
deteriorate  rapidly  to 47.6% by the year 20509.
9  Demographic  factors  should  ring  alarm  bells  for the stability  of the system  in the
very long run, but do not give cause  for concern  over the next thirty  years  or so.
Nevertheless,  as argued  below,  radical  reforms  may  be necessary  at this early stage  to avoid
painful  solutions  when  demographic  pressures  undermine  the stability  of the system.
14The total  dependency  rate provides  an indication  of the total  burden  on the
economically  active  population  from  both children  and old people. Because  of the rapid
decline  in the birth rate, the total dependency  rate experiences  a vast  improvement  in Tunisia
until  the year 2020,  but starts  to deteriorate  gradually  after that point.
System  dependency  rates. Despite  the favorable  demographic  structure,  the system
dependency  rate of the three pension  funds  has deteriorated  over the 1980s. For CAVIS,  it
rose from 8.7% in 1980  to 13.7%  in 1985  and 19.1%  in 1990. For the scheme  for public
sector  employees,  the dependency  rate improved  between  1980  and 1985  from 18.7%  to
15.9%.  but then deteriorated  rapidly  to 19.7%  in 1990. In CREGT,  the dependency  rate is
much  higher  and deteriorated  from 21.6% in 1980  to 22% in 1985  and 27% in 1990  (Table
4).
Table 4
TUNISIAt Required Contribution Rates*
1980  1985  1986  1987  1990
CAVIS
Dependency rate  8.7  13.7  16.6  18.8  19.1
Effective replacement rate  35.6  43.3  44.0  46.1  41.6
Required contribution rate  3.1  5.9  7.3  8.7  7.9
Actual contribution rate  5.0  5.0  5.0  5.0  8.0
CNRPS
Dependency rate  18.7  15.9  17.0  18.1  19.7
Effective replacement rate  43.6  61.4  59.9  63.2  61.3
Required contribution rate  8.2  9.8  10.2  11.4  12.1
Actual contribution rate  12.0  12.0  12.0  12.0  12.0
CREGT
Dependency rate  21.6  22.0  23.4  24.3  27.0
Effective replacement rate  55.7  60.8  54.5  53.8  56.5
Required contribution rate  12.0  13.4  12.8  13.1  15.3
Actual contribution rate  15.1  15.2  15.0  15.1  15.1
*  Disregarding the contribution of net investment income
Source:  Based on data provided by the Ministry of Planning
The system  dependency  rate for the pension  schemes  is higher  than  the demographic
dependency  rate of the population  at large,  partly  because  of the inclusion  of widows  and
orphans  in the number  of pension  beneficiaries'"  and partly  perhaps  because  of the different
10  The reported  system  dependency  rates are distorted  by the inclusion  of widows  and
orphans. Their  inclusion  also  lowers  the system  replacement  rate since  widows  and orphans
are normally  entitled  to a fraction  of the pension  of retired  workers. A more  accurate
estimation  of the dependency  rate should  translate  widows  and orphans  into retired  worker
equivalents,  based  on their reduced  replacement  rates. However,  traditional  reporting
systems  do not make  such  an adjustment  and for the sake  of comparability  with  other reports
15demographic  structure of covered workers compared to the large uncovered segment of the
population. Evasion and the eclectic solidarity mentioned  above may also be a factor,
especially in the schemes  for workers in the agricultural  sector, which report very high
dependency  rates in excess of 50% in one case and 64% in an another (Table 1).
Apart from the growing maturity of the schemes, which enables more workers to
become  eligible for a pension as time goes on, an important  factor in the rise of the system
dependency  rate has been the offer of early retirement to workers in declining industries.
Early retirement has been used as a means of creating employment  opportunities  for younger
workers.
The rise in unemployment  in the mid-1980s  has also affected the system dependency
rate in the private sector.  In contrast, the fall in the dependency  rate of the public sector
scheme is probably due to the large rise in public sector employment  in 1984 and 1985.
Replacement  rates.  The growing maturity of the pension sy.,ctn should also be
reflected in the average  effective replacement  rate.  This grew from 35.6% for CAVIS in
1980 to 43.3% in 1985 (Table 4).  Because of the offer of early retirement  and the
introduction  of proportional pensions for workers with 5 years of credited service, it fell to
41.1  % in 1990. For the public sector scheme, the replacement  rate increased from 43.6 % in
1980 to 61.4 % in 1985 and fell very slightly to 61.3  % in 1990. In 1991 the rate dropped to
55.4%.  For CREGT, the replacement  rate grew from 55.5% in 1980 to 60.6% in 1985 but
then fell to 56.5% in 1990. These replacement  rates refer to the average for retired workers
and surviving widows  and orphans.  They correspond tu significantly  higher replacement
rates for retired workers.
The combination  of dependency  rates and effective  replacement  rates gives the
required contribution  rates for schemes that operate on a pay-as-you-go  basis (Table 4).  It
can be seen that contribution  rates were adequate for all three funds in the early 1980s. The
contribution  rate became insufficient  for CAVIS after 1985, but for the public sector scheme
and CREGT contribution  rates continued to be adequate until the end of the 1980s.
The data of Table 4 also reflect the adverse impact  of the economic  recession  of
1986/87  on the financial  condition  of CAVIS. The sudden rise in the dependency  rate of
CAVIS implies that unemployment  reduced the level of active contributors, while early
retirement may have inflated the number of pensioners.  Moreover, the rise in the effective
replacement  rate suggests that the earnings ratio (i.e. the ratio of the average salary of
pensioners  at retirement to the average salary of active contributors)  was higher in the
recession years.  This would occur if the economic  recession  had a greater adverse impact on
lower income workers.
on social security, the traditional  approach is followed in this report.
16As a result of these adverse changes, contributions  amounted to 70% of pension
payments in 1986 and to only 59% in 1987.  This lends support to the view of the Tunisian
officials that the financial  performance  of CAVIS was exceptionally  poor in the years 1986
and 1987, which were used as the basis for the actuarial study conducted  by ILO in 1989.
However, the financial  pressures highlighted  in the ILO study underscore the need for both
short-term measures  and for more radical long-term reform.
Investmnent  performance.  A contributing  factor to the deterioration  of the financial
condition of the funds has been their poor investment  performance. The funds have been
required to invest a sizable proportion of their reserves in government equipment  bonds that,
despite Tunisia's moderate  rate of inflation, yielded negative rates of return of the order of
2% to 3% per year.
But the funds have also suffered from large investments  in social housing at low
rents.  The investment  return on social housing has been less than 2% in nominal  terms or
negative 6% to 7% in real terms" 1.
The provision of social housing has been motivated  by the same concept of solidarity
that underpins the functioning  of the partially funded pension system.  Extending  the scope of
social action of the pension system into the housing sector has undermined  its ability to meet
its primary objective, which is the payment of adequate pensions. It is also far from certain
that housing operations benefit the most needy segments  of the affiliated  population.
In recent years, the pension funds have discontinued  new investments  in social
housing in an attempt to boost the investment  income of the funds.  But the funds have
expanded their involvement  in the provision of housing finance and personal loans at rates of
interest that are similar to those charged by the Housing Bank, though still below market
levels.  The authorities  have also stopped  issuing new equipment  bonds to the pension funds
at low rates of interest and have allowed the funds to invest in marketable  government  bonds
at market yields.  As a resuit of these measures, the average rate of return on fund
investments  rose from 4.7% in 1985 to 6.2% in 1990. This is still negative in real terms,
while investments  in assets with below market yields, such as social housing, equipment
bonds and special loans, still accounted  for 72% of total investment  assets in 1990.
The low investment  performance  of the pension funds is underscored  by the very
small contribution  made b" net  nvestment  income (after deducting administrative  expenses).
Expressed as a percent of total salary bills, and therefore comparable  to the contribution  rates
levied by the different funds, the contribution  of net investment  income amounted to less than
11  It is not clear whether the t omputation  of retums allows for potential gains from the
revaluation  of real estate.  However any revaluation  gains will be realized only when houses
are sold at market prices.  In the meantime,  housing investments  generate low nominal
income.
171  % in most  years  during  the 1980s,  except  for the public  sector  scheme  where  it was closer
to 2% for the three years 1988  to 1990. In the case of CAVIS,  the contribution  of net
investment  income  was negative  in seven  out of the twelve  years  between  1980  and 1991.
18International  Experience
Before reviewing the main principles and objectives  of reform and discussing the
merits and demerits of different options, it may be useful to consider briefly recent
international  experience in the area of social security and pension  reform" 2.
In most developed  countries, the pension  system comprises several pillars.  The first
pillar is usually  a basic scheme financed  through fiscal transfers or by payroll taxes and
organized as essentially a pay-as-you-go  system with very limited funding. Nevertheless, in
some countries, such as the United States, Japan and Sweden, the basic scheme is partially
but extensively  capitalized and has accumulated  substantial  resources.  In some countries,
such as Sweden and the United Kingdom, the first pillar is divided into two parts, one
offering a flat rate minimum  pension  and the other providing  earnings-related  pensions.
The basic schemes generally  co-exist with a second pillar that is usually orgarized
along occupational  or professional  lines.  In some countries, for example France, Italy and
Greece, the complementary  schemes  also operate on essentially  pay-as-you-go  principles, but
in the majority of developed  countries, and especially  in Anglo-American  and Scandinavian
countries, they operate as capitalized systems.
A third pillar consisting  of voluntary savings  also plays an important  complementary
part in the pension systems of many countries.  These take the form of long-term contractual
savings with insurance companies, short-term deposits  with banking institutions, investments
in mutual funds and marketable  securities, and owner-occupied  housing.  Voluntary  long-
term contractual  savings often benefit from generous fiscal advantages. Such tax-advantaged
savings are an important source of pension income for self-employed  people who are not
covered by occupational  schemes.
Many developed  countries with pay-as-you-go  systems face growing pressures on
their social pension insurance systems as they have promised  very high benefits that are
difficult to sustain in the light of the growing maturity of systems and the progressive aging
of their populations. In several countries, the social pension system is faced with a
fundamental  financial  disequilibrium  between feasible  contribution  rates and promised
pension  benefits and is even threatened with imminent  insolvency. For instance, in the case
of Greece, the deficit of the social security system, which covers both the social pension
system and other social services, amounted  to 10% of GDP in 1988. Such countries are
often forced to take emergency  action to avoid the financial  collapse of their pension system.
This action may include imposition  of earmarked  taxes and/or lowering of real pensions,
through deferment  of retirement  age or failure to adjust pensions to inflation.
12  This review draws extensively  on Vittas and Skully (1991).
19In other countries, action to correct the imbalances  of social pension systems has
been taken at an earlier stage.  Such action has generally involved  an increase in contribution
rates (where this was economically  feasible), a reduction in benefits (by lowering the
effective  replacement  rate or prolonging the retirement age), and a promotion  of private
pension funds to reduce the burden on the social pension system. Spain undertook  a major
reform of its pension insurance system in the mid-1980s,  placing strong emphasis  on the
development  of private pension funds.  Portugal, Austria and France have also taken steps to
promote personal pension plans.  In the United States, where there are well developed
company-based  pension schemes, the reform of the social pension system has involved
reductions in benefits through  a deferment  of normal retirement age and increases in
contribution  rates that aim at accumulating  substantial  reserves that could help meet the
increased pension liabilities  over the next 50 years or so.
The relative role of different pillars in the provision of pension insurance varies
across countries, mainly depending on the generosity and credibility  of the benefits of the
first piilar.  In Germany  and several other continental  European countries, the existence of a
credible social pension system with generous benefits has narrowed the scope for the
development  of both company-based  schemes and personal pension plans, although  the
growing pressures on the public schemes have stimulated  interest in promoting
complementary  capitalized  private pension schemes. In other high income countries,
especially Anglo-American  countries (such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada
and Australia)  but also Switzerland,  the Netherlands  and increasingly  Sweden, company-
based or industry-wide  pension schemes  play a major part in the provision of pensions" 3.
In these countries, the growing reliance on funded pension schemes has led to the
accumulation  of large long-term funds.  Available  estimates  show that in 1987 the total assets
of pension funds and life insurance companies  corresponded  to 133% of GDP in Switzerland,
117% in the Netherlands, 105% in the United  Kingdom, 72% in the United States and 63%
in Sweden.  Institutional  investors play a very important  part in the financial markets of these
countries and have facilitated  the development  of active, efficient and sophisticated  capital
markets.
In most countries, participation  in the social pension system is compulsory.
However, only Switzerland  among  developed  countries has so far made compulsory  the offer
by employers of company-based  pension schemes 14, while France imposes  compulsory
membership in the supplementary  second-pillar  pension schemes  that are organized on
professional  or industry-wide  lines on a pay-as-you-go  basis.  In the United Kingdom,
companies  have the option to contract out of the earnings-related  part of the social pension
13  For a discussion  of the performance  of pension funds in industrial countries, see
Davis (1992).
14  For a discussion of the Swiss experience,  see OECD (1988) and Vittas (1993).
20system,  while  more  recently  individual  emnployees  have  been  entitled  to opt out of both the
earnings-related  social  system  and company-based  pension  schemes  in favor  of personal
pension  plans.
Among  developing  countries,  the social  pension  systems  operating  on a pay-as-you-
go basis have  faced  an acute  financial  crisis  in several  Latin  American  as well as Eastern
European  countries. The high inflation  of the 1980s,  the widespread  evasion  and the
capricious  redistribution  caused  by inconsistent  and irrational  benefit  formulas  have  weakened
the financial  integrity  and solvency  of traditional  systems  in several  Latin  American
countries,  especially  those  with mature  systems  and rather  aging  populations.
The contrasting  experience  of Argentina  and Chile  are worth  noting  in this respect.
In both countries,  the existing  social  pension  systems  faced  growing  financial  deficits  and
redistributive  problems  in the late 1970s.  Argentina  raised  substantially  the contribution
rates to contain  the financial  deficit  of the system  and introduced  indexation  of pensions  to
minimize  the extent  of capricious  redistribution.  However,  the increased  contribution  rates
induced  greater  evasion. Combined  with the fall in formal  employment  caused  by
macroeconomic  developments  in the mid-1980s  and the continuing  high level  of inflation,  the
result  was a big shortfall  in revenues. Faced  with increased  deficits  and to avoid complete
financial  insolvency,  the authorities  reduced  arbitrarily  pension  benefits  below  the legally
prescribed  targets  and also  provided  financial  support  through  treasury  transfers  or through
the imposition  of earmarked  taxes  on the consumption  of necessities,  such  as oil, gas and
telephone  services. The arbitary reduction  of pension  benefits  has been  challenged  in the
courts by aggrieved  pensioners  with the result  that the government  is now faced  with a huge
liability  for unpaid  pensions  as well as a nonviable  system  that requires  urgent  reform.
It is interesting  to note that the contribution  rate for the pension  system  amounted  in
1990  to 26% in Argentina.  This would  have  been  adequate  to cover  pension  payments  at ali
effective  replacement  rate of 70% and a system  dependency  ratio of 37%. The demographic
dependency  rate in Argentina,  defined  as people  aged  60 and over as a percent  of people
aged  between  20 and 59 was 28% in 1990. However,  widespread  evasion  and an expansion
of benefits  caused  the system  dependency  ratio to grow  from 39%  in 1980  to 52% in 1985
and 65% in 1990. Financial  equilibrium  would  then have  required  a 46% contribution  rate.
Obviously,  any attempt  to collect  such  a high  rate would  have  induced  greater  evasion  and
would  have  been  self-defeating.  Instead,  the authorities  reduced  arbitrarily  the effective
replacement  rate from 65%  in 1980  to 50% in 1985  and 42% in 1990,  giving  rise to the
protests  of pensioners.  The Argentinian  experience  shows  that financial  equilibrium  cannot
be sustained  when  a high  replacement  rate and a high dependency  rate come  together  to
require  a high  contribution  rate that would  induce  additional  evasion,  thus further  raising  the
dependency  rate" 5.
15  This analysis  of the Argentinian  pension  system  is based  on semi-official  data.
Although  these  data may  differ somewhat  from the actual  levels  of dependency  and
21In contrast  to Argentina,  Chile  undertook  a fundamental  and radical  reform  of its
pension  system. It replaced  the existing  pay-as-you-go  system  with  one based  on individual
capitalization  accounts. This is a government-mandated  but privately-run  compulsory  system
that is operated  by specialized  pension  fund  management  companies.  The new  system  is
subject  to draconian  regulation  and supervision  to ensure  the safe  and profitable  investment
of accumulated  balances. Duing its first ten years  of operation,  the new Chilean  system,
which  makes  extensive  use of indexed  instruments,  has acc-umulated  resources  equal  to 30%
of GDP and has achieved  an average  real rate of return  of 13%  per year, despite  its
relatively  high  operating  costs' 6.
The Chilean  system  involves  the offer of a number  of important  government
guarantees  that protect  workers  against  failures  of pension  management  and insurance
companies  and also  promise  a minimum  pension  to workers  with low incomes  or interrupted
employment  careers  that may  not be able to obtain  adequate  pensions. The Chilean  system
has stimulated  the development  of the securities  markets  and is likely  to play an even  greater
role in the future  in mobilizing  long-term  resources,  financing  long-term  investments  and
stimulating  the growth  of equity  and bond ma kets.
Other  Latin  American  countries  have  much  younger  populations  and pension  systems
than either  Argentina  or Chile  and their  pension  systems  are not yet under  extreme  financial
pressure. For instance,  in Mexico  contribution  rates of as low as 6% are adequate  to pay
high  targeted  replacement  rates  because  the dependency  rate is less than 10%. However,
Mexico  also suffers  from capricious  redistribution  caused  by the use of irrational  and
unindexed  benefit  formulas  and pension  payments. AS a result  of the very high inflation  of
the mid-1980s,  the majority  of pensioners  receive  the minimum  pension,  which  is indexed,
irrespective  of the level  of their  salaries  at retirement. The visible  success  of the Chilean
reform  has encouraged  the authorities  of several  other Latin  American  countries  to
contemplate  similar,  if scmewhat  less radical,  reforms.
Eastern  European  countries  also suffer  from strong  financial  pressures  on their social
pension  systems. In Hungary,  a high system  dependency  rate of 50% combined  in 1989  with
a relatively  low effective  replacement  rate of 58% to produce  a required  contribution  rate of
29%17.  The actual  contribution  rate was 28%, leaving  a small  deficit  that was covered
replacement  rates, any differences  are unlikely  to be large. The protests  of pensioners
received  wide  publicity  in Argentina  and pensioners  obtained  court  decisions  recognizing
large accumulated  claims  on the government  resulting  from  the failure  to maintain  the real
value  of pensions.
16  For a detailed  description  and analysis  of the Chilean  pension  scheme,  see Vittas  and
Iglesias  (1992)  and Gillion  and Bonilla  (1992).
17  The analysis  of the Hungarian  pension  system  is based  on data  contained  in Kopits
et al (1990).
22from general revenue.  Hungary  experienced  a big increase in the dependency  rate as a result
of an expansion  of eligibility  to a growing number of beneficiaries. The system dependency
rate deteriorated from 29% in 1970 to 41% in 1980  and 50% in 1989. This did not reflect a
progressive aging of the Hungarian population,  the demographic  dependency  rate of which
rose from 32% in 1970 to 35% in 1990, but a large expansion  of pension eligibility  caused
by the low retirement  age, early retirement  provisions and the growing maturity of the
system.  The low replacement  rate is due to the failure to make adequate  adjustment for
inflation to pensions except for beneficiaries  aged 70 and over.  Thus, a nominal targeted
replacement  rate of 75% is reduced to an average  rate of less than 60%, with older people
receiving  low pensions in real terms.  As the system would  be nonviable under low inflation,
the Hungarian authorities have taken measures  to reduce the level of benefits by extending
the normal retirement age and lowering initial pension levels, while indexing  pensions to
price changes in order to protect their real value.  The development  of the private sector may
also give rise to evasion if a high contribution  rate continues  to apply.  Most other former
socialist countries in Eastern Europe and Central Asia face similar problems.
In several Asian and African countries, the pension system is based on national
provident funds.  These are forced savings schemes  that involve the use of individual
capitalization  accounts  operated by a public agency.  In Singapore  and Malaysia, where the
level of contribution  rates is very high, the provident funds have accumulated  very large
long-term resources, amounting  respectively  to 72% and 41% of GDP in 1987.  The main
difference with the Chilean scheme is the public management  of funds.  This has resulted in
lower operating costs but also lower investment  returns 18. In fact, except for Singapore  and
Malaysia, provident funds in several Asian and African countries suffered from negative real
rates of return.
Many countries  in the Arab world as well as in Asia and the Middle East, such as
Jordan, Turkey and the Philippines, operate with partially funded scaled  premium schemes
similar to those found in Tunisia.  In general, these schemes face uncertain  actuarial futures
because of their growing maturity and the progressive  aging of their covered populations.
Most schemes  also suffer from poor investment  returns on their accumulated  reserves.  The
case of Egypt is of particular interest.  A very high contribution  rate of 26% in relation to
the very young demographic  structure of the country has contributed  to the accumulation  of
very large financial  resources. These amounted  to 40% of GDP in 1988. However, the
reserves have been placed with the National Investment  Bank to finance public expenditures
and pubJfc  sector companies. Negative real rates of return of as much as 15% per year have
reduced the relative importance  of pension  reserves to 30% of GDP in 1991. The very high
contribution  rate in Egypt does not appear to be based on an actuarial assessment  of future
pension liabilities. The system is in effect more a tax on labor than a forced savings scheme
IS  The experience of Singapore  is reviewed in Asher (1991), Queisser  (1991) and
Vittas (1993).
23and is used  to fund  the deficit  of the public  sector,  broadly  defined  to include  the numerous
public  sector  enterprises.
This brief  review  of international  experience  shows  that there  are strong  pressures
on the financial  viability  of public  pension  systems  that operate  on a pay-as-you-go  or
partially  funded  basis. These  emanate  from the progressive  aging  of the population  and the
ambitious  targeted  benefits. There  is an international  trend  towards  a lowering  of pension
benefits  offered  by public  schemes  and toward  the adoption  of a multi-pillar  structure  with
privately-run  systems  complementing  the benefits  offered  by the existing  public  schemes.
The  promotion  of private  pension  schemes  raises  issues  of tax treatment  as well as regulation
and supervision  in order to achieve  equitable  treatment  of all segments  of the population  and
ensure  the safety  and profitable  investment  of accumulated  funds. But they appear  to enjoy
various  advantages  over unfunded  or partially  funded  public  schemes  and their role is
growing  in many  high and low income  countries.
24Options for Reform
Global Vision and In-Depth Review
Like the pension systems of most high and low income countries, the Tunisian
pension system has reached a stage in its development  that calis for a fundamental
reconsideration  of its basic objectives  and operating characteristics. Being a partially funded
scaled premium system, the Tunisian  pension system has been subject to periodic actuarial
reviews that examined  its financial  condition  in the light of detailed actuarial projections.
However, the actuarial reviews have not involved  a basic reexamination  of the role and
function of the pension system in the context of a growing and maturing economy.
The current and future problems  highlighted  above underscore the need for an in-
depth review.  Such a review would need to adopt a global vision of the pressures and
opportunities  for reform.  It would need to address both short and long term issues and aim
to create a system that would be stable, equitable, efficient and transparent.
In this respect, it is worth considering  the basic rationales for the creation of pension
systems and the basic objectives  of such systems.  Pension specialists  note four reasons that
may  justify an active public policy role in mandating  or encouraging  the creation of pension
systems.  Three of these reasons are inter-related  and reflect the failure of voluntary market
solutions to provide adequate protection  to old age people against the loss of income from
retirement or disability.  These include the myopic behavior of younger people who fail to
save enough for their old age, the absence of private annuity markets that could cover the
risk of excessive  longevity and the lack of information  that would allow younger people to
make reasonable  decisions  about the merits and demerits of very long-term arrangements.
The provision of fiscal incentives  and/or the imposition  of mandatory  pension systems may
overcome these problems. The fourth rationale relates to the desire to redistribute income
from high to low income workers, and especially  to the elderly poor.  Although there is no
compelling  reason why such redistribution  should be part of a pension system financed  from
payroll taxes (it could for instance be financed  from general revenues like other poverty
alleviation schemes), most countries incorporate  redistributive  objectives  in their pension and
social security systems.  One explanation  for this may be the greater administrative  ability to
raise taxes through  a payroll tax system.
Although insufficient  voluntary  provision for old age is a basic rationale for active
public policy, pension specialists  have traditionally  discouraged  the use of a high degree of
funding  because of the difficulty  of maintaining  the real value of accumulated  reserves, the
absence of developed  capital markets, and the risk of political  interference in the allocation
of resources. They have instead favored  partially funded scaled  premium systems similar to
those found in Tunisia.  However, the growing demographic  pressures of partially funded
systems and the gradual but steady development  of capital markets are causing a
reconsideration  of this philosophy. There is now greater willingness  to separate the
25redistributive  from the mandatory  savings functions  of pension systems and to allocate a
greater role to the private sector in managing  the mandatory  savings component.
Guiding  Principles
The problems afflicting the existing pension system are highly complex and affect
many groups of people in ways that are often difficult to disentangle. Any proposal for
reform is bound to affect vested interests of pensioners, of workers nearing retirement, or of
workers belonging to privileged groups.  In addition, the process of reform would be
complicated  by basic legal and regulatory issues and by the fiscal and equity implications  of
transition. For this reason, it is important for the Tunisian  authorities to lay down the
principles that wouid guide the proposed reform and to explain to all parties concerned the
implications  of these principles.
The most important  principle is to set out the main objective of a pension insurance
system. Essentially, this is the provision of economic  security to retired and disabled
workers and their dependents. Thus, the overriding principle would be the offer of adequate
but affordable  and therefore sustainable  benefits. A limited amount of intentional
redistribution  from high to low income workers may be included in the objectives  of a well
functioning  pension system, although  it is generally  preferable to effect social welfare
policies through general tax revenue rather than through  payroll taxes that distort incentives
in the labor market.
A second important objective  is the creation of a strong link between contributions
and benefits.  Such a link will: (i) reduce evasion as workers will have a strong incentive  to
ensure that employers meet their obligations  to the system; (ii) minimize  any incentive
distortions on the functioning  of the labor marjcet;  and (iii) avoid the capricious  redistributive
effects that result from high and volatile inflaJpn and from inconsistent  minimum  service
requirements.
A third objective of reform is the generation  of long-term savings to fund future
pension benefits and help stimulate  the development  of capital markets".  This implies that
over time an increasing  part of the system should  be funded and that a competitive  industry
of professional  fund managers should be developed. Institutional  investors are likely to exert
pressure for more efficient market mechanisms,  including more reliable and fair trading and
settlement  facilities, better accounting  and auditing standards, and greater disclosure  of
meaningful  information  to investors. The realization  of these potential benefits will depend
on the regulation and supervision  of pension  funds.  Direction of their funds into low-
yielding  government securities would negate their potential  contribution  to the development
of the capital markets and should not be allowed. Instead, the main principles guiding the
19  The potential contribution  of pension funds to the development  of capital markets is
discussed in Vittas (1992b).
26investment  policies of pension funds should be the safety and profitability of reserves.  A
panoply of prudential controls and an effective  system of monitoring  and supervision  will be
required to increase public confidence  in the credibility and financial stability  of the system.
A pension reform may also have a positive impact on the rate of national saving, although
this is likely to be small and transitory.  The main macroeconomic  benefit will be the
improvement  in economic  efficiency that is likely to result from the scrutiny and selection  of
investment  projects through market mechanisms.
Within this general framework, there are a number of reform options that merit
detailed consideration. These can be classified  into three groups: those that need to be
implemented  in the short-term; those that could form part of a limited reform that would aim
to place the functioning  of the pension system on more sound footings, but without affecting
its present structure; and those that would form part of more radical reform that would go
beyond tinkering with the parameters  of the existing system and would seek to bring about
extensive structural change.  A more radical reform would anticipate  the strong demographic
pressures that are likely to arise in the longer-run  and would avoid a more painful transition
at a later stage.
Short-Term  Reforbs
There appear to be two pressing short-term measures  that need to be taken to ensure
the financial  equilibrium  of the funds:
*  First, to avoid the financial  insolvency  of CAVIS, it is necessary to raise
the contribution  rate allocated  to CAVIS, perhaps from the present 8% to
12%.  This would not involve an increase in the overall social security
burden on the private sector but would entail a re-allocation  of contributions
between CNSS and CAVIS. It might be appropriate to revise the schedule
of contribution  rates to make more explicit the part that covers CAVIS and
the sharing of the burden between employers and employees. This is now
obscured by the fact that a significant  part of CAVIS revenues appears to be
provided by CNSS.  The contribution  rates of the other two funds do not
appear to require an immediate  increase, though a rise might be needed in
the medium  term.
Second, it is necessary to enhance  further the investment  performance  of the
funds.  Ideally, this should involve a withdrawal  of pension funds from the
provision of special loans at below market rates and an acceleration  of the
replacement  of low-yielding  equipment  bonds with government securities
earning market rates of interest. Pension funds should be encouraged  to
invest in safe marketable  securities at market rates of return.  Disposition  of
the existing stock of housing units at market prices would also need to be
considered.
27Program of Limited Reforms
A program of limited reforms could include the rationalization  and revamping  of the
benefit formula, the integration of schemes  or the harmonization  of benefits across schemes,
and a reconsideration  of the scope for social action of the pension system.  Because some of
these reform measures  are likely to affect vested interests and acquired rights, any change
should be implemented  gradually, but subject to a clearly specified  and publicized plan.
To effect a rationalization  of the benefit formula, consideration  would need to be
given to the following:
*  Increase in the normal retirement age.  To contain the increase in costs and
lower the dependency  rate, the normal retirement age could be increased to
65 or more.  This change could be implemented  gradually by adding one
year every two years.  The minimum  retirement  age could also be increased
in the same fashion to 55 or even 60.  Disabled workers would be covered
by disability  provisions, while redundant workers in declining industries
could continue to benefit from lower minimum  retirement  age, provided an
effective system of policing employment  patterns is developed  to ensure that
such people do not re-enter the labor market.
*  Abolition  of minimum  required credited service.  This would remove the
discrimination  against workers with less than the minimum  vesting  period.
The recent provision in the private sector scheme for proportional pensions
after 5 years of service has already reduced the relevance of a minimum
service requirement.
Abolition of maximum  replacement  rate.  This would remove the existing
disincentive  against continued  working by older workers and would allow
more flexible  retirement  decisions.
*  Introduction  of reduced linear accrual factor.  This would remove the
distortionary  effects of existing arrangements. The accrual factor could be
reduced to less than 2% per year of credited service and could also be
related to the net pensionable  salary after deducting pension and other social
security contributions. Use of actualized  lifetime earnings after a
reasonable transition  period (see below) would eventually  obviate the need
for using annual accrual factors.
*  Use of actuarial decrements for early retirement and actuarial increments
for late retirement. This would remove existing distortions  in favor of early
retirement  or in favor of retirement at the normal age.
28*  Remgval of service credits.  This should cover all service credits, except
for military service.  It would eliminate  distortions that increase pension
payments without a commensurate  increase in contributions.
*  JUse  of actualized  career lifetime income for pensionable  salary.  This
would eliminate  the incentives  for under-reporting  of salaries when young
and overstating  salaries during the last few years of employment.
Actualization  could be based on changes in consumer  prices or in average
wages.  The use of lifetime  actualized  earnings could be introduced
gradually by including one additional  year each calendar year.  This would
allow the accumulation  of adequate computer records and would avoid any
distortions  in treating workers of different age groups.
*  Imposition of ceilings on contributions  and benefits.  This would limit the
scope of public pension schemes, which would be targeted to replace the
income of low and middle income groups.  It would also encourage the
development  of complementary  funded private schemes.
\  *  Rationalization  of pension indexation. This could cover indexation  to the
consumer  price index.  Although this is not always the most appropriate
index, it would on average protect the standard of living of pensioners,
without imposing  a huge burden.  Price indexation  could be suspended
when real wages, and hence real revenues from contributions,  are falling.
However, real pensions  could be adjusted accordingly  when real wages start
rising again.  Price indexation  of pensions  would increase the financial
burden on pension schemes. However, the answer to this would either be
an increase hn contribution  rates or a decrease in targeted replacement  rates.
Lack of indexation  affects the real pensions  of older beneficiaries.
The integration of pension schemes  and their formal separation from the provision of
health insurance raises many issues, not least the question of administrative  efficiency and
convenience. The attempt in 1986 to establish three separate  national funds, one for
pensions, one for health care, and one for family allowances  failed in part because it
disregarded  the benefits of integrated  provision of pension and health services.  The complete
separation  of the financial  accounts  could still be achieved for each existing pension  and
social fund without  integrating across the private and public sector.
However, such a solution would place an even greater emphasis on harmonizing  the
rules and conditions of different schemes  in order to avoid distortions in the labor market and
ensure equitable  treatment of all employees. The measures  incorporated  in the limited
reforms mentioned  above would go a long way toward producing harmonized  conditions for
a sustainable  level of benefits.  Harmonization  should not aim to replicate the most generous
conditions  available in different schemes, but should seek to establish  a fair and viable
29system that would not discourage labor mobility and especially transfer of employees  from
the public to the private sector.
The last important  aspect of a program of limited reform would cover a
reconsideration  of the scope for redistribution  and social action by the pension system.  With
the rationalization  of the benefit formula along the lines described above, the incidence of
erratic and capricious redistribution  should be substantially  reduced, if not completely
eliminated.  Consideration  could then be given to the desired level of redistribution. This
would involve a detailed examination  of the level of the minimum  pension for full service
employees  and of the minimum  pension for workers obtaining  a proportional pension.  It
could also cover the case for using progressive contribution  rates and/or degressive
replacement  rates.  Use of such schedules  would not weaken the marginal link between
contributions  and benefits. But consideration  of the scope for social action by the pension
funds would confirm the trend away from the provision of housing and other services and the
involvement  of pension funds in subsidized  housing finance and consumer  credit.
Program of Radical  Reform
The program of limited reform would be able to eliminate  the incentive  distortions
that afflict the present system and thus improve the financial  condition of the schemes, but it
would not be able to cope with the strong demographic  pressures that are likely to arise in
the more distant future.  For this, a more radical reform would be required that would also
aim to avoid a very painful transition at a later stage.  The painful experience  of Argentina,
which delayed  a radical reform of its system by a decade, should be a reminder of the
problems that could arise when pensioners  acquire rights that are difficult to honor.
A program of radical reform could involve the establishment  of a multi-pillar  system
that could consist of three, and perhaps even four, pillars:
*  The first pillar could cover a public scheme operating on a pay-as-you-go
basis and offering basic pension  benefits either as a flat rate or related to
earnings but subject to a reasonably low ceiling.  This pillar could have an
essential redistributive  objective and could also protect low and middle
income workers against inflation and excessive longevity. It would need to
use a rational benefit formula along the lines discussed  above and could be
financed from payroll contributions  or from general tax revenues.
*  The second pillar could be a mandatory  savings scheme  based on individual
capitalization  accounts.  This would have a strong link between
contributions  and benefits. Depending  on the level of contribution  rates and
employee  coverage, it could accumulate  substantial  long-term financial
resources and thus contribute  to the development  of the capital markets.
The system could be government mandated  and managed through the
creation of a national provident fund, similar to those found in Singapore
30and Malaysia. Howe ter, a state monopoly  may encourage operational
inefficiency  and low inivestment  returns.  An alternative  option would be a
govemment mandated  but privately managed system. This would require
the stipulation  of deta led rules and regulations  to protect the interests of
members and guide tIre investment  of accumulated  funds in safe and
profitable instruments. A further possibility would be a public agency for
registering affiliates, collecting  contributions  and paying pensions which
would minimize operating costs, but subject  to a requirement for farming
out the investment  of accumulated  funds to professional  fund managers
subject to clearly set out rules and guidelines. This combination  might
contribute to a minimization  of operating costs and a maximization  of
investment returns.
*  The third pillar could consist of optional but funded company-based  pension
schemes that would seek to offer additional supplementary  benefits. Such
schemes may be offered by large companies, including multinational
corporations operating in Tunisia.  They often aim to encourage finm
loyalty and firm specific  training.  However, their role would be clearly
limited if a second pillar along the lines described above were to be
established. Company-based  schemes  could benefit from fiscal advantages,
but they would need to be regulated  to ensure equitable treatment of all
employees  and safety of their investment  assets.
*  The fourth pillar would consist of voluntary savings in the form of bank
deposits, life insurance  policies and annuities, marketable  securities and
investments  in real assets, such as owner-occupied  housing. The role of
voluntary savings would depend on the scope of the first three pillars and
especially the size of the two compulsory  pillars and on their relative fiscal
treatment.
The policy options available to the Tunisian authorities  would need to be analyzed
and assessed on the basis of detailed actuarial projections  and simulations. These would help
determine the extent of reform as well as the size of particular variables, such as coverage
and eligibility, contribution  rates, replacement  rates, retirement  age, minimum  pensions,
indexation mechanism  and relative size and scope of different pillars.  The policy simulations
would also need to address the problem of transition, especially  if a program of radical
reform were to be adopted.
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